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Abstract 
Internet-based information systems (IS) have enabled a variety of forms of collective action, 
such as aggregating globally distributed development effort (e.g. open source software), 
problem solving (e.g. innovation marketplaces), or resources (e.g. crowdfunding). Within the 
domain of crowdfunding, Internet-enabled Peer-to-Peer Lending Systems (IP2PLS) have 
emerged as a disruptive technological genre, with implications for the financial services 
sector, business capitalization strategies, and personal and community development. IP2PLS 
have captured the attention of the Information Systems research community, and studies of 
user behavior in IP2PLS have revealed the saliency of social identity, personal transparency, 
and information sharing in such systems. We argue that the current state of knowledge is 
limited by methodological bias towards the study of particular IP2PLS providers, and report 
the findings of a study of a very large but under-researched platform. Through an analysis of 
116,669 loan records, and a subsequent analysis of 1000 records manually coded through a 
content analysis process, we investigate the impact of information sharing on user behavior in 
an IP2PLS, revealing relationships that frequently contradict the findings from prior research. 
The paper discusses the contributions of our work towards a more complete and 
heterogeneous picture of user behavior in IP2PLS, implications for researchers of other 
crowdfunding systems and/or other emerging forms of IS-enabled collective action, as well 
as for system designers, users and providers. 
Keywords: Internet-enabled Peer-to-Peer Lending Systems, Crowdfunding, Collective 
Action, Information Sharing, Personal Transparency, Social Identity 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents the findings of an empirical study theorizing the relationships between 
social identity, personal transparency, information sharing, and consequent user behavior in 
an emerging form of networked information system (IS) designed to support collective 
action, namely Internet-enabled Peer-to-Peer Lending Systems (IP2PLS).  
We categorize IP2PLS as a member of a growing portfolio of Internet-based IS that enable 
collective action on a global scale. Such systems include the communication, coordination 
and collaboration tools used to aggregate distributed skill and knowledge in the development 
of open source software (e.g. Linux) and open content (e.g. Wikipedia), the contest platforms 
used to aggregate creativity (e.g. Threadless) and innovation (e.g. InnoCentive), the 
infrastructures that enable collective micro-work (e.g. Mechanical Turk) and collective 
information processing (e.g. tagging systems), and the systems to enable the global pooling 
of computing resources (e.g. BOINC). Specifically, IP2PLS are platforms that enable the 
aggregation and exchange of financial resources and are thus related to other electronic 
marketplace platforms (e.g. Kickstarter) designed to support the process of crowdfunding.  
All of the phenomena above have attracted enormous scrutiny from the IS community due to 
their disruptive and transformative nature. These Internet-native systems (among others) have 
enabled the emergence of new forms of creativity, productivity, and problem solving that 
challenge our thinking about the nature of innovation and work. As generative and evolving 
phenomena, they enable IS researchers to explore some of the fundamental questions of the 
IS discipline, specifically (as Benbasat and Zmud (2003) phrase it) the “human behaviors 
reflected within, and induced through both the (1) planning, designing, constructing, and 
implementing, and (2) direct and indirect usage of [IS] artifacts … [and the] … the impacts 
(direct and indirect, intended and unintended) of these artifacts on the humans who directly 
(and indirectly) interact with them.”  
Within the domain of crowdfunding, IP2PLS have likewise emerged as a disruptive 
technological genre, with implications for the financial services sector, business 
capitalization strategies, and personal and community development. IP2PLS support Peer-to-
Peer Lending (P2PL), a form of crowdfunding in which lending occurs “between private 
individuals on online platforms where financial institutions operate only as intermediates 
required by law” (Bachman et al., 2011, p.2). The origins of P2PL are associated with 
Zopa.com in the UK, the first large platform dedicated to P2PL (Iacobuzio 2006, Kupp and 
Anderson 2007, Briceno Ortega and Bell 2008) and since then, various other platforms have 
emerged in countries around the world. Such platforms include Prosper and Lending Club in 
the US (Wang and Greiner 2011), PPDai and My089 in China (Chen and Han 2012), 
Popfunding in South Korea (Jeong et al., 2012), and Smava in Germany (Pötzsch and Böhme 
2010).  
Within IP2PLS, the interplay of the technology with the subtle human biases and social cues 
that influence lending behavior (how personal and humanizing data are shared and 
interpreted) is particularly salient, and has attracted researcher attention from both IS (e.g. 
Greiner and Wang, 2009) and cognate disciplines including Economics (e.g. Dezső and 
Loewenstein, 2012), Human Resources (Pope and Sydnor, 2011), Business Education 
(Livingston and Glassman, 2009), and Marketing  (e.g. Herzenstein  et al.,, 2011b).  
The current work is driven by this interplay between the human and the technological. While 
we acknowledge the economic importance of IP2PLS as an electronic marketplace (c.f. Chen 
et al., 2009), in this study we posit that it is the ability of users to humanize other users 
(specifically of lenders to humanize borrowers, and the ability to infer the borrower’s 
trustworthiness and identity from their social affiliations), that is fundamental to 
understanding the dynamics of these systems. Problematically, while there is consensus 
around the importance of the impact of personal information in P2PL, it is often discussed in 
terms that assume homogeneity across different IP2PLS, despite the evidence that the 
functionalities of these systems (and the motivation and behavior of their users) can vary 
widely (Wang et al., 2009, Bachmann et al., 2011). This is further complicated by the bias in 
the empirical research literature towards a small number of P2PL platforms, primarily 
Prosper, thus leading to an incomplete picture of the phenomenon.   
In response to this situation, our study has been specifically designed to target an under-
investigated P2PL platform, Lending Club, which would appear to differ in several 
significant ways from the dominant subjects of prior research, e.g. by offering less scope for 
unstructured personal information, photographs, and formal within-platform social ties. 
Consequently, it less clear how borrowers’ social identity can be inferred in such IP2PLS, 
and several important and unanswered questions emerge. Thus, through an analysis of 
116,669 loan records, and a subsequent analysis of 1000 records manually coded through a 
content analysis process, we investigate the impact of information sharing on user behavior in 
the Lending Club IP2PLS, revealing relationships that frequently contradict the findings from 
prior research.  
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we conceptualize the phenomenon of interest 
through a synthesis of prior research, and develop the theoretical model used in the study. 
Specifically, we utilize Social Identity Theory to theorize information sharing and 
information sharing expectancy within and between IP2PLS. Second, we present our study 
design. We describe our sampling strategy and the selection of our field site, discuss the 
nature of our transaction data set and describe our data coding process (with coding examples 
also given in Appendix A). Third, we present our findings, in two parts. Iteration 1 describes 
the regression analysis methods employed and presents our findings on how user sharing of 
“hard” data predicts user behavior, based on an analysis of 116,669 loan records. Iteration 2 
describes the regression analysis methods employed and presents our findings on how user 
sharing of “soft” data predicts user behavior, based on an analysis of 1000 randomly selected 
and manually coded loan records. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the 
work’s contribution towards a more complete and heterogeneous picture of user behavior in 
IP2PLS (an important emerging type of IS), and implications for researchers of other 
crowdfunding information systems and/or other emerging forms of IS-enabled collective 
action, as well as for system designers, users and providers. 
SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY, IP2PLS AND INFORMATION SHARING 
A number of researchers have investigated the factors impacting on the likelihood of 
borrowers attracting investment (e.g. Iyer et al., 2009, Herzenstein et al., 2011a) and the 
likelihood of loans being repaid (e.g. Klafft 2008, Luo et al., 2011) in IP2PLS. In line with 
such studies, we argue that social identity and personal cues (via information sharing) are key 
factors effecting the behavior of users of such systems.  
Social Identity Theory and IP2PLS 
The construct of social identity (aka ‘collective identity’ (Ashmore et al. 2008)) emerges in 
its contemporary form from studies of inter-group conflict that revealed an individual’s 
appetite for social mobility vs. social change/competition was influenced by the extent to 
which they identified with their dominant in-groups (e.g. Tajfel 1979, Tajfel and Turner 
1980). This idea (sometimes referred to synonymously) was subsequently explored further 
and formalized as ‘social identity theory’ (SIT) positing that individuals comprise multiple 
identities, each relating to different social networks in which that person interacts (Stryker 
1980, Hoelter 1983). These within-network identities are role-based, the details of which are 
negotiated over the course of ongoing interaction with other network members (c.f. Stets and 
Burke 2000). While these roles vary in detail, recurring patterns have been identified based 
upon the self-image of network members, e.g. self-doubters vs. soldiers, strugglers vs. 
stencils (Alvesson 2010). As an individual’s roles become more embedded within the overall 
network dynamic, so their identification with that network and personal attachment to it 
increases (Stets and burke 1999).  
To date, the concept of social identity has featured in IP2PLS research in two ways. The first 
of these regards the inference of the reliability of borrowers, based on social networks within 
the IP2PLS in question (e.g. Berger and Gleisner 2009, Greiner and Wang 2009, Bachman et 
al., 2011). These studies assume that the social networks associated with borrowers, as well 
as the identity of borrowers within those networks, play an important role in explaining both 
lenders’ investment decisions and borrowers’ likelihood of repaying that investment. This 
assumption is supported by observations of lending and repayment behavior within the 
explicit borrower groupings facilitated on Prosper (Freedman & Jin 2008, Herrero-Lopez 
2009, Lin 2009). In these contexts, greater investment occurred because lenders made 
inferences about the identity of the borrower based upon known characteristics of the group, 
while greater repayment occurred as a result of the borrowers’ commitment to that group and 
consequently, their higher susceptibility to the normative pressures to repay. However, a 
more developed social identity is not always a positive predictor of behavior. Within the 
Korean lending platform Popfunding.com, it was shown that failed loan postings damage 
borrowers’ social identity in terms of their social and financial credibility, and so inhibit 
future investment in them (Jeong et al., 2012). Similarly, within PPDai, a large IP2PLS 
platform based in China, it has been shown that borrowers who observe their online friends 
default are twice as likely to default in the future (Lu et al., 2012).  
Second, social identity has been used to understand the inference of the reliability of 
borrowers based on offline, external social identities. The number of such identity claims is 
higher among borrowers with poor credit scores, suggesting the intention of borrowers may 
be to present a less finance-specific identity to lenders (Herzenstein et al., 2011b). However, 
the impact of these identity claims on lending is not always positive, even those apparently 
relevant to borrowers’ ability and/or intention to repay (c.f. Pötzsch and Böhme 2010, 
Herzenstein et al., 2011b, Larrimore et al., 2011). 
One key aspect of SIT that has not been addressed in existing IP2PLS research surrounds the 
role of language and information expectations in how lenders and borrowers interact. The 
greater an individual’s commitment to a network the more salient that role-identity becomes 
for the individual’s self-definition, compared to other roles they perform (Stryker and Serpe 
1994). Higher role-identity salience allows an individual to more effortlessly gauge role 
expectations from other members of the network and adjust their behavior accordingly 
(Callero 1985, Haslan et al., 1999, Shih et al., 1999). This adjustment is a mutual and 
reciprocal process that gradually accumulates within the interaction within a network, 
producing a culture of implicit and explicit communication signals (c.f. Eliasoph and 
Lichterman 2003). Thus, the behavior of an individual who is less embedded within some 
social network may be perceived as less competent that that of another individual, not 
because of rational judgments but because their method of interacting is more consistent with 
expectations (Stryker 1968, Haslan et al., 1999, Stets and Burke 2000). Put differently, one 
network member’s trust in another’s ability to perform a role may be influenced by their 
fluency with ‘structured symbolic interactions’ (Stryker 2008). This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. SIT and Information Sharing Expectations 
 
As network boundaries deepen and the movements of individuals from one network to 
another decrease, so between-network competition and discrimination are likely to occur 
(Tajfel and Turner 1980). In online communities, a more extreme version of this tendency 
has been observed in the formation of what is termed ‘xenonetworks’ by Reay Atkinson et al. 
(2013, 2014), whereby diversity-intolerant bubble communities form around some core 
indicators of likeness. Those authors note that such likeness among members is typically 
communicated within less structured information in the form of ‘weak’ signals (c.f. 
Granovetter 1973). These weak signals are often subsequently encoded in formal 
informational procedures for that network and hence act as useful predictors of future 
information structuring and governance developments (Ansoff 1975, Hiltunen 2008). 
Such a perspective explains accounts where functionally interchangeable behaviors are 
acceptable in some networks but not others. This has been observed in a variety of situations, 
for example within intra-organizational social relationships (Ashforth and Mael 1989, Dutton 
et al., 1994, Haslam et al., 2000), and in relationship marketing (Arnett et al., 2003, 
Bhattacharya and Sen 2003, Michalski and Helmig 2008). It has also been used to account for 
user participation in online communities in settings outside of IP2PLS, including general 
knowledge contribution (Shen et al., 2010), as well as consumer product discussion and 
reviews (Forman et al., 2008).  
From an IP2PLS perspective, this raises an important question as to whether the various 
platforms such as Zopa, Prosper, Lending Club, PPDai, Popfunding, and Smava share a 
common community/network of borrowers and lenders, or whether each possesses a distinct 
group of participants. As each of these platforms represents a competing marketplace, the 
latter appears more likely. Under such conditions where users of a network benefit from the 
number of other users present, network externalities act to create oligarchies from individual 
competitors, and eventually a monopoly (c.f. Katz and Shapiro 1985). This occurs because 
while the requirements for new markets are more open, standards emerge over time to 
increase market efficiency, resulting in social, economic, and technological convergence 
around market leaders (Katz 1996, Uzzi 1996). This has important implications for individual 
IP2PLS providers, as it suggests that as the market matures, IT capabilities will converge 
around a subset of platforms and between-network competition for mainstream survival and 
dominance will increase, to the detriment of social mobility among their users. Thus, IP2PLS 
providers are not only competing for market share, they are also competing to establish the 
future paradigm of IT capabilities dictating the types of explicit and implicit information 
expected by lenders (see Figures 2 and 3).  
 
Figure 2. Information Sharing Expectations within and between Systems 
 
This observation means that it is important to understand both the types of information 
explicitly and implicitly expected from/by users in of an IP2PLS, as well as the impact that 
information sharing through the IP2PLS has on user behavior.  
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Figure 3. Information Sharing Expectations for Some Specific System 
 
The types of explicitly expected ‘hard’ data that predict lending behavior 
The perceived risk associated with particular individuals is often a factor of the accumulation 
of past experience between transacting parties (Pavlou and Gefen 2004). However, the nature 
of P2PL means that such an accumulation of interactions may not be possible, as “most loans 
are ‘one-shot’ events, that is, borrowers usually apply for (and receive) a loan just once. 
Therefore, the main avenue available in relational settings to engender confidence in 
another’s behavior, i.e., through exemplary behavior over time, is not available” (Herzenstein 
et al., 2013, p.12). Hence, the standard required credit information used to portray a 
borrower’s financial identity in IP2PLS reflects accumulated financial interactions across a 
range of domains. One of the most prominent pieces of information in this regard is 
borrowers' credit scores, which are considered a useful means of predicting loan applicants’ 
likelihood of repayment in traditional lending decisions (c.f. Mester 1997). Such credit scores 
have been shown to impact positively upon both investment (Klafft 2008b, Iyer et al., 2009, 
Puro et al., 2011) and repayment (Freedman and Jin 2008, Livingston and Glassman 2009) in 
studies of behavior on Prosper. IP2PLS platforms may include both internally and externally 
generated credit scores. For example, Lending Club provides one credit score that it 
calculates based on the information provided by borrowers, but also a FICO credit score, 
which is generated by a US-based third party (see http://www.myfico.com/myfico/Credit 
Central/ScoringWorks.asp). It is anticipated that better credit scores, both internally and 
externally generated, will predict higher levels of both investment and repayment.  
IP2PLS also provide lenders with other historic data concerning applicants’ previous 
financial behavior. This may come in the form of the number of public records held by the 
applicant, as well as a record of any account delinquencies with which they are associated. As 
each of these reflects negative previous experiences that other lenders have experienced with 
the applicant, it is predicted that their frequency should be detrimental to both their likelihood 
of receiving and repaying investment. Such data are further contextualized with data 
describing the number of months since an applicant’s most recent record or delinquency. 
Given that lenders are more likely to be concerned with recent transgressions that those 
taking place several years ago (Guiral-Contreras et al., 2007), it is also predicted that a higher 
number of months since an applicant’s most recent record or delinquency will increase both 
their likelihood of receiving and repaying investment.  
Lenders in IP2PLS are also influenced by explicitly requested personal information about the 
borrower’s ongoing financial situation. This includes the borrower's income (Puro et al., 
2010, Lu et al., 2012), their homeownership status (Herrero-Lopez 2009, Larrimore et al., 
2011), and their number of years in employment (Livingston and Glassman 2009, Larrimore 
et al., 2011). These factors allow borrowers to demonstrate the strength of their financial 
identity, and so should support both investment and repayment.  
Borrowers' existing usage of credit from other parties have further been shown to impact 
upon decision making in IP2PLS, including data relating to the credit lines possessed by an 
applicant and an applicant’s current utilization of their revolving credit (Herrero-Lopez 2009, 
Iyer et al., 2009, Puro et al., 2010). Lenders may also infer borrowers’ difficulties in 
managing their debt using information such as those borrowers' debt-to-credit ratios and the 
number of credit inquiries for the borrower made by potential lenders (Klafft 2008a, Lin 
2009, Larrimore et al., 2011). These records afford an opportunity to validate a borrower’s 
financial identity by showing that they can manage debt appropriately.  
Finally, 'hard' data relating to the terms and conditions of the loan are typically presented in 
IP2PLS contexts. This includes the loan amount, the loan duration, the interest rate, and the 
monthly repayments. A higher loan amount and duration demand more investment to meet 
the loan requirements, meaning there is intuitively less chance of meeting investment goals 
and more difficulty in repayment. Given that lenders are at least partly motivated by financial 
returns, higher interest rates and monthly repayments are likely to attract greater investment. 
However, as these factors place additional financial responsibility on borrowers, they appear 
less likely to encourage repayment.  Interestingly, while the latter three pieces of data have 
been shown to impact upon lending behavior (Puro et al., 2010, Ceyhan et al., 2011, 
Herzenstein et al., 2011a), data on Prosper show no impact on either investment or repayment 
for the stated purpose of the loan (Pope and Syndor 2011).  
The types of implicitly anticipated ‘soft’ data that predict lending behavior 
In addition to the explicitly required information for borrowers on P2PL platforms, 
individuals have the opportunity to make other information transparent in the context of their 
loan descriptions. Viewed in trust terms, providing additional information may reduce 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and so can be interpreted as a gesture 
of benevolence intended to convey a borrower’s strong intentions of repayment (Pötzsch and 
Böhme 2010). This is supported by existing P2PL research, which shows that longer loan 
descriptions are generally associated with higher levels of lending (Larrimore et al., 2011). 
Yet, from a SIT perspective such disclosures may not necessarily be advantageous. This is 
because the provision of data that is not anticipated by lenders damage the sense of shared 
meaning (Burke and Reitzes 1991) and distance the applicant from the ‘identity standard’ 
(Burke 1991) for loan applicants possessed by lenders. Thus, deviating from the norm, even 
with the intention of demonstrating benevolence, may undermine lenders’ confidence in the 
applicants’ commitment to their role. This means that while the quality of required hard data 
is likely to determine its impact on lending behavior, it is the normalcy of optional soft data 
that may moderate its impact. This makes it challenging to determine in advance whether 
various forms of information will have positive or negative impacts on investment and 
repayment behavior. However, this study will begin with the assumption that the competitive 
nature of P2PL platforms means that implicitly expected information for some platforms will 
have a negative impact on investment and repayment behavior elsewhere. In the case of 
Lending Club, this implies all of the soft data observed to positively influence behavior on 
peer-to-peer lending in existing research should theoretically have a negative impact (because 
existing research to date targeted only competitors).  
The forms of optional soft data described in existing literature in P2PL range across three 
dimensions, namely additional credit information, personal or humanizing information, and 
direct appeals made to lenders. In the context of appeals made to lenders, these appear to 
have a negative effect, e.g. there is evidence from Prosper to suggest that justifications for a 
borrower’s current financial situation discouraged lenders (Larrimore et al., 2011). This may 
be because Prosper, unlike microfinance sites such as Kiva, presents itself as a financially 
motivated platform; hence, such claims may appear out of place. This is also supported by 
findings on Smava (Pötzsch and Böhme 2010), which show a negative response by lenders to 
statements arousing pity about the borrower’s situation.  
Conversely, positive additional credit information about one’s financial identity should have 
the opposite effect, as illustrated in the context of user narratives on Prosper (c.f. Herzenstein 
et al., 2011b) where positive claims concerning how an individual conducted themselves 
financially in the past, as well as how they intend to behave in the future, encouraged 
investment (though interestingly made repayment less likely). These positive claims have 
also been observed on Prosper in the form of explanations/acknowledgements of previous 
financial transgressions, or alternatively explanations/denials of previous financial 
transgressions – both of which positively influence lenders by reframing or qualifying 
negative information presented in borrowers’ credit histories and financial records 
(Sonenshein et al., 2011).  
Other soft data that can influence lending behavior relates to descriptions of borrowers’ 
employment status and occupation. This is interesting because, while Prosper began 
presenting a borrower’s occupation with that borrower’s listing in 2007 (Freedman and Jin 
2008), this information is not presented on other sites such as Lending Club. Yet, this 
information plays an important role in Prosper, particularly in the formation of advantageous 
borrower groups (Everett 2010). Such information also plays a role in demonstrating a 
Prosper borrower’s stability, which is considered a crucial predictor of repayment (e.g. 
Livingston and Glassman 2009). For similar reasons, borrowers also frequently list their 
educational background, although only this manifests only a marginal impact on lenders’ 
preferences on both Smava (Pötzsch and Böhme 2010) and on PPDai.org (Lu et al., 2012).  
The types of humanizing information that borrowers utilize to attract investment also varies 
significantly. As noted already, Prosper members typically use affiliations between members 
to build trust by association (Greiner and Wang 2009, Herrero-Lopez 2009, Bachman et al., 
2011). However, platform-external borrower data are also observed to have positive impacts 
on several platforms. For example, studies of photographs on Prosper show that lenders are 
influenced by borrowers’ age (Duarte et al., 2012, Ravina 2012), gender, ethnicity (Pope and 
Syndor 2011, Duarte et al., 2012), obesity, perceived happiness (Pope and Syndor 2011), 
marriage status, children/dependents (Duarte et al., 2012), and physical attractiveness 
(Ravina 2012). There is also some evidence to suggest that that claims of morality, 
religiousness, and political-mindedness can also benefit borrowers on Prosper (Herzenstein et 
al., 2011b), as are claims by borrowers on Smava of past or future kindness that were enabled 
by the loan and/or debt being consolidated (Pötzsch and Böhme 2010). While some of these 
claims appear to demonstrate lender prejudice, e.g. gender, ethnicity, others appear to be 
interpreted as accepted normative indicators of borrowers’ personal reliability and 
responsibility.  
STUDY DESIGN 
The previous sections have identified the relationships between different forms of 
information sharing and user behavior in IP2PLS (summarized in Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Preliminary Model of Relationship between Information Sharing and User 
Behavior 
 
These relationships emerged from observations of user behavior made in existing research 
across a range of IP2PLS, including Prosper, Smava, Popfunding, and PPDai.org. It must 
now be investigated whether these relationships are consistent across IP2PLS (meaning the 
social networks of lenders and borrowers do not differ significantly across the range of 
platforms) or whether users of different IP2PLS interpret information sharing in 
fundamentally different ways. To address this question, this study first looks at the different 
IP2PLS, in order to find a suitable environment to compare against existing research 
situations. An approach to data gathering is then described through which to test these 
relationships. 
IP2PLS Site Selection 
As noted, a variety of IP2PLS have been studied in existing research. This is reflected in 
Table 3, which lists the platforms studied in all existing academic research known to the 
authors, and in which the likelihood of lender investment and/or borrower repayment in P2PL 
is investigated.  
Table 3. The online platforms used for data gathering by existing research that 
investigates the likelihood of lender investment and/or borrower repayment 
Prosper Freedman and Jin (2008), Klafft (2008a), Klafft (2008b), Berger and 
Gleisner (2009), Duarte et al., (2009), Greiner and Wang (2009), 
Herrero-Lopez (2009), Iyer et al., (2009), Lin (2009), Livingston and 
Glassman (2009), Collier and Hampshire (2010), Greiner and Wang 
(2010), Puro et al., (2010), Wang and Greiner (2010), Bergovich 
(2011), Ceyhan et al.,(2011), Herzenstein et al., (2011a), Herzenstein 
et al., (2011b), Larrimore et al., (2011), Luo et al., (2011), Pope and 
Syndor (2011), Puro et al., (2011), Sonenshein et al., (2011), Chaffee 
and Rapp (2012), Chen and Han (2012), Duarte et al., (2012), Ravina 
(2012), Zhang and Liu (2012) 
Popfunding Do et al., (2012), Jeong et al., (2012), Lee and Lee (2012), Yum et al., 
(2012) 
Kiva Sinanan (2009), Barry (2012), Moodie (2013) 
PPDai Chen and Han (2012), Lu et al., (2012) 
Zopa Bachmann et al., (2011) 
My089 Chen and Han (2012) 
Smava Pötzsch and Böhme (2010) 
 
By far the most popular IP2PLS for researchers appears to be Prosper. Interestingly, Lending 
Club does not feature in any of these studies, although it is mentioned in some broader 
discussions of IP2PLS, e.g. in the context of legal regulations (Chaffee and Rapp 2012), or as 
a contrast to Prosper (Wang and Greiner 2011). This is surprising, given the scale and maturity 
of Lending Club as a platform, which, like Prosper, was launched in 2006. Although Zopa.com 
is often thought of as the first legitimate IP2PLS (Hulme and Wright 2006), Prosper is credited 
with encouraging most scientific interest in the subject by making the platform’s data public in 
2007 (Bachmann et al., 2011). Yet, in the past number of years, the number of loans issued by 
Lending Club has significantly surpassed that of Prosper (Cunningham 2013), as illustrated in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The value of loans issued on the Prosper and Lending Club platforms 
 
In terms of loan value, both Prosper and Lending Club offer the ability to apply for a loan 
between $2,000 and $35,000. The minimum credit scores are also comparable, with Lending 
Club and Prosper requiring minimum scores of 660 and 640, respectively. Both Lending Club 
and Prosper charge borrowers a fee to take out a loan in the range of 1-5% depending on the 
borrower (Prosper calls this a “Closing Fee”, whereas Lending Club calls it an “Origination 
Fee”) and as of 2012, the returns for investors were similar (9.79% for Lending Club and 
9.26% for Prosper (LendStats.com, retrieved Dec 2014)).  
Yet, three significant differences exist in the lending mechanics employed by Prosper and 
Lending Club. Firstly, while interest rates in Lending Club are determined by the platform 
itself according to the borrowers’ credentials, Prosper adopts an auction system that allows 
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lenders to bid amounts at varying interest rates. Secondly, the listing mechanism for Prosper 
allows borrowers to post additional personal information, such as pictures of borrowers and 
their families. This has been demonstrated to introduce a number of significant social and 
cultural antecedents impacting upon lender and borrower behavior, such as a borrower’s 
gender, age, ethnicity, whether they have children, whether they are part of a couple, a 
borrower’s obesity, and a borrower’s physical attractiveness (Klafft 2008b, Pope and Syndor 
2011, Duarte et al., 2012). Thirdly, Prosper allows members to form groups, which means 
that established members can endorse borrowers, hence lenders can infer trustworthiness 
from borrowers’ social networks (Berger and Gleisner 2009, Greiner and Wang 2009, 
Herrero-Lopez 2009).  
While the auction mechanism is important for a number of economic reasons (c.f. Chen et al., 
2009), the latter two differences are especially important in the context of social identity. The 
ability to humanize the borrower and the ability to infer the borrower’s trustworthiness and 
identity from their social affiliations, inform the majority of IP2PLS studies concerned with 
social identity. Thus, several important and unanswered questions emerge surrounding a 
IP2PLS like Lending Club, which provides fewer system features for sharing personally and 
socially rich information; consequently it is not clear how a borrowers’ social identity can be 
inferred by lenders. This makes Lending Club a valuable source of comparison with the more 
commonly studied P2PL platforms, and in particular with Prosper.  
Data Gathering  
Given that Lending Club presents significantly less system support for personal information 
sharing as regards soft data, two possibilities must be considered. The first is that such soft 
data does not feature in any meaningful way on Lending Club, meaning that borrowers’ 
relevant social identity (and to an extent the behavior of Lender-users) is determined from 
only ‘hard’ data relating to the loan being requested. The second possibility is that ‘soft’ 
personal or social data is incorporated in some other format (unanticipated behavior by 
Borrower-users). To address these two possibilities, two iterations of data gathering and 
analysis were employed, each of which made use of publically available transactions records 
from Lending Club (downloaded from www.lendingclub.com on March 20th 2013). The 
purpose of the first iteration was to determine the explanatory power of the hard data and 
whether it alone is sufficient to explain user behavior on Lending Club. Conversely, the 
purpose of the second iteration was to determine the frequency with which different form of 
soft personal data was shared, as well as the relationship between this form of information 
sharing and user behavior.  
The first iteration used the complete set of available records to analyze the predictive power 
of borrowers’ hard data. These records included 119,419 loan applications from June 7, 2007, 
to June 19, 2013 (retrieved July 23rd 2013 via a publically available file download from the 
Lending Club website). Data cleaning required that 2,749 of these be removed to ensure the 
integrity of the overall data set, as these related to loans that did not meet current policy 
requirements. A further three listings were removed that did not contain standard required 
information, such as loan ID or applicant usernames.  
The second iteration analyzed the predictive power of borrower’s soft data sharing based on 
information voluntarily provided in the “Loan Description” field attached to loan requests. As 
described already, the Lending Club IP2PLS does not present users with the same 
opportunity as sites such as Prosper to divulge additional personal and social data. However, 
this Loan Description field offers borrowers some opportunity to divulge such information, if 
they so choose. Hence, these fields were manually coded by gathering a random sample of 
1,000 records. Records were coded independently by two research assistants in blocks of 10, 
40, 50, 100, 200, 200, 200, 250, and 150. When coding was completed for each block, the 
research assistants compared their results to identify incongruities. Resolution of these 
incongruities was straightforward in some cases, while others were resolved in consultation 
with the authors of this study. The authors also independently evaluated the results of coding 
by independently coding a random sub-set of each block to verify their accuracy and identify 
any additional issues. This random validation sampling demonstrated a coding consistency of 
>95% by the end of the process.  
Appendix A provides a detailed table of the codes used along with example text from loan 
descriptions. Eight codes reflected additional credit information. These were coded at three 
ordinal levels, namely “no new information,” “some new information,” and “substantial new 
information.” The codes were   
1. Additional loan purpose information 
2. Justification of financial situation 
3. Claims of future financial responsibility 
4. Claims of past financial responsibility 
5. Acknowledgement/Denial of financial transgressions 
6. Education details 
7. Employment status 
8. Occupation details 
Fourteen more codes reflected key types of personal or humanizing information that might be 
provided by borrowers. These were coded in binary terms, i.e. they were either present or 
they were not. These included 
1. Links to other members 
2. Links to other online presences 
3. Links to photographs 
4. Age 
5. Gender 
6. Ethnicity 
7. Marriage details 
8. Children and dependents 
9. Hobbies 
10. Health and obesity 
11. Religious or political views 
12. Claims of kindness 
13. Please or thanks 
14. Existence of follow-up comments 
These additional measures allowed us to explore relationships observed on IP2PLS such as 
Prosper, PPDai and Smava, as well as observations made by Lee and Lee (2012) on the 
Popfunding platform (namely that the number of postings made by borrowers on the Q&A 
board positively influenced lender-users’ behaviors).  
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Iteration 1: How hard data predicts lending behavior on Lending Club  
Loan records (N =116,669) included an internal Lending Club credit grade ranging from a 
high of A1 to a low of G5, with a five-number summary of (A1, B1, B5, C5, G5). These 
numbers are represented numerically for the purposes of testing from 1-35, where A1 = 1 and 
G5 = 35. All but 2 of the listings (N =116,667) also include an external FICO range, varying 
from 660-664 to 846-850, with a five-number summary of [660-664, 680-684, 695-699, 725-
729, 846-850]. These FICO ranges were represented by the middle number in each range for 
the purposes of testing, e.g. such that 660-664 was replaced with 662.  
111,046 (95.2%) of applicants possessed no records on file, while 5,230 (4.5%) possessed 
only one record on file, and only 343 (0.2%) possessed more than one record. A five-number 
summary of the 5,623 listings involving applicants possessing one or more public records is 
[1, 81, 95, 107, 129]. Only 54 applications (0.05%) were made by applicants who listed 
previous account delinquencies, with a five-number summary of the delinquent amount 
among these 54 applications of [17.00, 53.25, 862, 4526.75, 65000] and a five-number 
summary of the months since the delinquencies occurred of [0, 1, 1, 2, 11]. Full homeowners 
comprised 9,026 (7.7%) of the applications (not including those currently paying off 
mortgages), while a five-number summary of the current number of years in employment and 
monthly income listed among applications was [0, 1, 2, 5, 9] and [333.33, 3583.33, 5000.00, 
7083.33, 595148.17], respectively.  
To test the impact of the hard data available for lenders in the Lending Club platform, a 
multiple logistic regression was used to determine the impact of these variables on whether or 
not the full proportion of funding was received. Another multiple logistic regression was used 
to determine the impact of these variables on the likelihood of a loan being charged off. The 
results of these tests are illustrated in Table 4.  
Table 4. Regression Output for Hard Data  
 
 
 
Predictor Variables 
Explanatory Power for 
Proportion Funded 
(Nagerkerle R2 10.5%) 
B 
Explanatory Power for Loan 
Defaults (Nagerkerle R2 
12.1%) 
B 
Credit Grade -.106*** .136*** 
FICO Grade -.025** .026*** 
Public Records .327* -1.255 NS 
Months Since Last Record .005** .007 NS 
Delinquent Amounts <.001 NS -.002 NS 
Months Since Last 
Delinquency 
.002 NS .005 NS 
Home Ownership  -.016 NS .310* 
Monthly Income <.001 NS <.001** 
Employment Length .028 -.052 NS 
Debt to Income Ratio 
2.588** 
-1.556 NS 
Open Credit Lines .016 NS -.040 NS 
Total Credit Lines -.003 NS .023 NS 
Credit Inquiries Past 6 
Months 
.004 NS .112 NS 
Revolving Credit Balance <.001* <.001 NS 
Revolving Line Utilization -.405 NS .646 NS 
Loan Amount <.001*** <.001 NS 
Loan Length .046*** -.017 NS 
Interest Rate 2.558 * -9.576*** 
Monthly Payment .005*** <.001 NS 
 
* = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001, NS = not significant 
 
The hard data explains 10.5% of the variance in funding. The data relating to borrowers show 
that an applicant’s likelihood of receiving all of the requested investment is positively 
correlated with a lower (better) credit grade, a lower (better) FICO range, fewer public 
records on file, more months since the most recent public record, a lower debt-to-income 
ratio, and a higher revolving credit balance. The data relating to the terms and conditions of 
the loan show that the loan amount, the loan duration, the interest rate, and the monthly 
repayments also impact an applicant’s likelihood of receiving investment. No other variables 
demonstrate any significant impact. 
The hard data on loan repayment explains 12.2% of the variance borrowers for whom loans 
have been charged off. The data relating to borrowers show that an applicant’s likelihood of 
defaulting on investment is negatively correlated with a lower (better) credit grade, a lower 
(better) FICO range, and a higher monthly income. The data relating to the terms and 
conditions of the loan show that an applicant’s likelihood of defaulting on investment is 
negatively correlated with higher interest rates. The data also show that the home ownership 
status of borrowers is a significant predictor of defaulting on loans. This was due to a slightly 
lower proportion of borrowers with mortgages were among those defaulting (39.6%) as 
opposed to those not defaulting (47.5%), and a slightly higher proportion of borrowers 
renting their homes defaulting (51.6%) as opposed to those not defaulting (44.7%). No other 
variables demonstrate any significant impact.  
The findings surrounding borrowers’ for whom loans were charged off show that little of the 
standard credit information for a borrower reliably predicts their likelihood of defaulting on 
investment. Similarly, from the quantitative terms and conditions of the loan, neither the loan 
amount, nor the loan duration, nor the monthly repayments predict borrowers' likelihood of 
defaulting.  
These findings are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, credit scores arguably represent a 
summary of all other data relating to the financial history and identity of a borrower, thus it is 
not surprising they present significant predictive power for lending. Yet, the general lack of 
support for data relating to specifics of borrowers’ financial histories suggests that borrowers 
are not concerned with the details of a borrower's past and present financial data. Secondly, 
the importance of the four factors relating to the terms and conditions of the loan illustrate 
that this may be of higher interest to lenders than the details of the borrowers themselves. 
Thirdly, many of the variables predicting investment do not actually predict repayment, with 
the exception of borrowers’ credit scores and the interest rate of the loan. Fifthly, and perhaps 
most interestingly, the overall explanatory power from all of these variables is surprisingly 
low, suggesting that lenders do not make decisions based on this hard data in isolation 
(assuming selections are not random and that lenders share some decision-making criteria). 
Thus, lending behavior on the Lending Club platform may only be moderately informed by 
hard data relating to the borrower in question and the loan being requested. All of this 
reinforces the possibility that soft data on Lending Club plays an important part in predicting 
lending behavior.  
Iteration 2: How soft data predicts lending behavior on Lending Club  
The data show that 44,982 (38.6%) of applicants chose to leave the loan description field 
blank, with the remainder of borrowers making some additional effort to contextualize their 
request. The provision of soft data by borrowers on Prosper has been argued to represent a 
desire to reduce information asymmetry and increase the perceived trustworthiness of those 
borrowers (Pötzsch and Böhme 2010, Herzenstein et al., 2011b). Similarly, longer loan 
descriptions may exaggerate this effect by representing even greater effort on the part of 
borrowers (Larrimore et al., 2011). Of those that provide loan descriptions on Lending Club, 
the lengths of these descriptions (measured in number of characters) vary notably, with a five 
figure summary of [1, 110, 207, 333, 3966]. However, contrary to findings on Prosper, a 
hierarchical regression shows that the provision (vs non-provision) of a loan description has 
no significant impact on a borrower’s likelihood of receiving investment for borrowers using 
Lending Club, and that the relative length of loan descriptions if provided has negligible 
explanatory power (see Table 5). This suggests that - if anything - it is the content of these 
descriptions that is important for lenders’ investment decisions; not their existence or length.  
Table 5. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting 
The Proportion of a Loan Request Received 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B B B 
Credit Grade  -.106*** -.106*** -.104*** 
FICO Grade  -.025** -.025** -.024** 
Public Records  
.327* 
.322* .316* 
Months Since Last Record .005** .005** .005** 
Delinquent Amounts <.001 NS <.001 
NS 
<.001 NS 
Months Since Last Delinquency .002 NS .002 NS .002 NS 
Home Ownership  -.016 NS -.017 NS -.024 NS 
Monthly Income  <.001 NS <.001 
NS 
<.001 NS 
Employment Length .028 .028 .028 
Debt to Income Ratio  
2.588** 
2.580** 2.471** 
Open Credit Lines  .016 NS .016 NS .016 NS 
Total Credit Lines  -.003 NS -.003 NS -.003 NS 
Credit Inquiries Past 6 Months  .004 NS .005 NS .004 NS 
Revolving Credit Balance  <.001* <.001* <.001* 
Revolving Line Utilization  -.405 NS -.398 NS -.372 NS 
Loan Amount  <.001*** <.001**
* 
<.001*** 
Loan Length  .046*** .046*** .045*** 
Interest Rate 2.558 * 2.528 * 2.427 * 
Monthly Payment  .005*** .005*** .005*** 
Loan Description Provided  -.068 NS .055 NS 
Length of Loan Description 
   
<.001* 
 
Nagerkerle R2 0.105 0.105 0.109 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, NS = Not Significant 
 
Research on Prosper also suggests borrowers’ desire to reduce information asymmetry may 
have positive indications of their likelihood to repay investment (Herzenstein et al., 2011b, 
Sonenshein et al., 2011). Unlike the mixed impact of loan descriptions on investment within 
Lending Club, the impact of the provision of loan description on repayment is significant. 
However, unlike Prosper, the effect on Lending Club is negative, i.e. those providing loan 
descriptions were significantly more likely to default on loans. A hierarchical logistic 
regression demonstrates that both the provision of a loan description, as well as the length of 
that loan description, predict more loans being charged off (see Table 6).  
Table 6. Summary of Hierarchical Logistic Regression for Variables Predicting 
the Likelihood of a Loan Being Charged Off 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B B B 
Credit Grade  .136*** .142*** .138*** 
FICO Grade  .026*** .027*** .025*** 
Public Records  -1.255 NS -1.148 NS -1.121 NS 
Months Since Last Record .007 NS .007 NS .007 NS 
Delinquent Amounts -.002 NS -.002 NS -.002 NS 
Months Since Last Delinquency .005 NS .005 NS .005 NS 
Home Ownership  .320* .329* .345* 
Monthly Income  <.001* <.001* <.001* 
Employment Length -.052 NS -.051 NS -.053 NS 
Debt to Income Ratio  -1.556 NS -1.442 NS -1.166 NS 
Open Credit Lines  -.040 NS -.043 NS -.043 NS 
Total Credit Lines  .023 NS .025* .024* 
Credit Inquiries Past 6 Months  .112 NS .106 NS .105 NS 
Revolving Credit Balance  <.001 NS <.001 NS <.001 NS 
Revolving Line Utilization  .646 NS .538 NS .486 NS 
Loan Amount  <.001 NS <.001 NS <.001 NS 
Loan Length  -.017 NS -.018 NS -.017 NS 
Interest Rate -9.576*** -9.419*** -9.312*** 
Monthly Payment  <.001 NS -.001 NS -.001 NS 
Loan Description Provided  .872*** .668** 
Length of Loan Description 
 
  
.001** 
 
Nagelkerle R2 0.121 0.141 0.149 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, NS = Not Significant 
 
However, it is difficult to draw conclusions based upon this finding, as this may be due to the 
increasing pressure for borrowers to address concerns when they are struggling to meet their 
repayments (and thus communicating with creditors through the loan description field). 
The mixed impact of loan descriptions on lenders’ investment decisions that is observed on 
Lending Club resonates with existing research of the impact of pictures in borrower profiles 
on Prosper. Studies have found that it is not necessarily the presence of pictures that 
influences lenders but rather the content of those pictures (Pope and Sydnor 2011, Duarte et 
al., 2012). This suggests the types of data shared in the Loan Description field are what 
determine the impact of personal transparency on lenders’ decision making. The frequency of 
each type of data shared in the loan descriptions in our data set is illustrated in Table 7.  
Table 7. Frequencies of codes in 1000 sample records 
Ordinal variables No new 
information 
Some new 
information 
Substantial new 
information 
Additional loan purpose 
information 
351 551 98 
Justification of financial 
situation 
925 56 19 
Claims of future financial 
responsibility 
882 107 11 
Claims of past financial 
responsibility 
769 200 31 
Acknowledgement of 
financial transgressions 
977 23 - 
Denial of financial 
transgressions 
994 5 1 
Education details 944 46 10 
Employment status 733 140 127 
Occupation 902 18 80 
Binary variables No mention Mentioned 
Links to other members 1000 - 
Links to other online 
presences 
1000 - 
Links to photographs 1000 - 
Age 997 3 
Gender 969 31 
Ethnicity 1000 - 
Marriage details 932 68 
Children and dependents 950 50 
Hobbies 995 5 
Health and obesity 955 45 
Religious or political views 998 2 
Claims of kindness 969 31 
Please or thanks 818 182 
Existence of follow-up 
comments 
826 174 
As for the previous investigation of hard data, the impact of the coded soft data was tested 
using a multiple logistic regression to determine the impact of these variables on whether or 
not the full proportion of funding was received. Another multiple logistic regression was used 
to determine the impact of these variables on the likelihood of a loan being charged off. The 
results of these tests are illustrated in Table 8. 
Table 8. Regression Output for Soft Data  
 
 
 
Predictor Variables 
Explanatory Power for 
Proportion Funded 
(Nagerkerle R2 12.5%) 
B 
Explanatory Power for 
Loan Defaults 
(Nagerkerle R2 
12.3%) 
B 
Additional loan purpose information -.371*** .389 NS 
Justification of financial situation -.085 NS .725* 
Claims of future financial 
responsibility 
-.190 NS 1.114** 
Claims of past financial responsibility .098 NS -.272 NS 
Acknowledgement of previous 
transgressions 
-.032 NS -1.191 NS 
Denial of previous transgressions -3.339 NS 1.560 NS 
Age -20.855 NS -19.271 NS 
Gender 
-.329 NS 
.153 NS 
Education details .164 NS -1.532 NS 
Employment status -.363** -.068 NS 
Occupation details -.401** .252 NS 
Hobbies -.424 NS -18.830 NS 
Marriage details -.287 * .111 NS 
Children and dependents .182 NS .081 NS 
Health and obesity .379 NS -.707 NS 
Religious or political views .466 NS -21.124 NS 
Claims of kindness .627 NS -.314 NS 
Please or thanks -.117 NS .608 NS 
Existence of follow-up comments 
.172 NS 
.128 NS 
 
* = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001, NS = not significant 
 
This regression predicts 12.5% of the variance in funding. The data show that an applicant’s 
likelihood of receiving investment is negatively correlated with the mention of their marriage 
status, additional information concerning the purpose of the loan, the borrower’s occupation, 
or their current employment status. No other soft data demonstrate any significant impact.  
The four significant binary variables contain qualitatively different information. Breakdowns 
of the types of information coded are presented in Figure 6. These breakdowns illustrate two 
trends. Firstly, lenders not only responded more negatively to borrowers providing more 
information about the purpose of the loan, their occupation, and their employment status, this 
negative response increased as borrowers’ level of detail increased. Secondly, borrowers 
mentioning their marriage or intention to get married were less likely to receive investment.  
 
 
Information given regarding the 
purpose of the loan. 
Information given regarding borrower’s 
employment status. 
 
 
Information given regarding the 
borrower’s occupation. 
Information given regarding borrower’s 
marital status. 
Figure 6. Breakdown of binary variables in terms of proportion of funding received. 
 
The logistic regression for the soft data on loan repayment predicts 12.6% of the variance in 
the number of borrowers for whom loans are charged off. The data show that an applicant’s 
likelihood of repaying investment is negatively correlated with justifications of their current 
financial situation, claims of future responsibility, and statements of gratitude. No other 
variables demonstrate any significant impact. Where these statements of gratitude are broken 
down, the data suggest that borrowers who thank lenders in advance of their investment are 
those most likely to default on their loans, χ2 (5, N = 1,000) = 13.93, p = 0.001 (see Table 9). 
Table 9. Contingency table of borrowers’ statement of gratitude and loan default 
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 No mention Thanks  Please Total 
Loans not charged off 797 (82.7%) 153 (15.9%) 14 (1.5%) 964 
Loans charged off 21 (58.3%) 14 (38.9%) 1 (2.8%) 36 
Total 818 167 15  
CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we have explored the relationships between user information sharing, 
information sharing expectations, and user behavior, through a two-iteration analysis of 
historical transactional data from Lending Club, a large Internet-enabled Peer-to-Peer 
Lending System (IP2PLS). Such systems are of key interest to the Information Systems 
research community, as they have emerged as a disruptive technological genre within the 
financial services area and are analogous to other Internet-based information systems 
supporting collective intelligence and action (such as open source software and innovation 
marketplaces) that have far reaching organizational and social implications.  
In line with extant research we conceptualize such systems in terms of their ability to support 
humanizing behaviors and exchanges, not simply financial transactions. Thus, our study was 
driven by the saliency of social identity, personal transparency, and information sharing in 
such systems (and the role played by the system in supporting such sharing.  Arguing that 
current knowledge is limited by bias towards particular IP2PLS providers, we chose to 
analyze a very large but under-researched platform. Our choice of site was driven specifically 
by the evidence that the functionalities and participants of different P2PL platforms vary 
widely (Wang et al., 2009, Bachmann et al., 2011).  
Our study makes several key contributions towards a more complete and heterogeneous 
picture of user behavior in IP2PLS, and has implications for researchers of other 
crowdfunding systems and/or other emerging forms of IS-enabled collective action, as well 
as for system designers, users and providers.  
Our final model, in which we theorize the impact of social identity and information provision 
on the behavior of users in the IP2PLS, is illustrated in Figure 7. It is noteworthy that our 
findings vary considerably from the observations of other IP2PLS previously investigated in 
the literature.  
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Figure 7. Revised Model of Relationship between Information Sharing and User 
Behavior in Lending Club 
First, we see that the kinds of hard financial data that have been identified as important on 
other platforms, have limited predictive power for Lending Club, both in terms of borrower 
repayment but especially in terms of lender-users behavior and investment decision-making. 
Second, we find that the hard data that best predicts borrower repayment behavior in Lending 
Club is not necessarily the same data that predicts the likelihood of borrowers receiving 
investment. For example the home ownership status of borrowers is a useful predictor of 
repayment neglected in borrower decision making, whereas a borrower’s revolving credit 
balance appears to have little or no predictive power over repayment, yet demonstrates a 
significant influence on lenders. These first two sets of findings suggest that much of the hard 
financial data known to impact upon lending behavior in platforms such as Prosper, does not 
impact lending behavior on Lending Club.   
Third, we found that the ‘soft’ financial and personal data revealed by borrowers within 
descriptions of the proposed loans, it is highly noteworthy that this soft data explained more 
of the variance in investment behavior than lenders’ hard financial data, which demonstrated 
no significant predictive power with the smaller sample size (p = .696). However, and equally 
notable, the majority of the predictive factors identified on other lending platforms had no 
significant impact on Lending Club. Indeed while some soft data did demonstrate significant 
predictive power, much of the data that benefitted borrowers on other platforms was in fact 
harmful to both investment and repayment on Lending Club.  
Fourth, none of the factors that were predictive of lending were predictive for repayment.  
Fifth, soft data that humanize borrowers and/or characterize them as family-oriented, while 
beneficial on platforms such as Prosper, had the opposite impact on Lending Club. Rather 
than demonstrating the reliability and/or trustworthiness of a borrower, such data appeared to 
dilute that borrower’s financial identity on Lending Club, to the detriment of their likelihood 
of receiving investment.  
These findings, taken together, expand our understanding of the wide variety of IP2PLS user 
behaviors between systems. These observed variations are our primary data contribution and 
significantly extend our empirical knowledge of IP2PLS user behavior.  
More critically, they expand our conceptual understanding of IP2PLS, and demonstrate the 
usefulness of viewing IP2PLS, through the lens of Social Identity Theory, as systems that 
support user decision making by enabling humanizing/social information exchanges. This 
conceptualization forms our primary theoretical contribution. Specifically, and consistent 
with existing research on identity theory, our findings suggest that the impact of information 
sharing on user behavior is related to platform-specific sharing expectations. Indeed, we see 
that unlike on platforms such as Prosper, revealing detailed personal information appears to 
be outside of the norm on Lending Club (i.e. occurs in a minority of requests and is not 
explicitly supported by the platform).  
Thus, lender-users appear troubled by unexpectedly transparent borrowers who disclose such 
information, rather than simply presenting themselves in purely financial terms. Interestingly, 
we note again that this unexpected humanizing soft data that appears to deter investment 
behavior has no actual predictive power over borrowers’ likelihood of repayment. In other 
words, the poor reception received by borrower-users that share “too much” data cannot 
simply be understood as a financial risk response, but is instead to be understood as a 
violation of community expectations. 
Thus our study (1) challenges the assumption that IP2PLS are homogenous by revealing 
contrary findings, (2) transforms our understanding of IP2PLS from purely transactional 
market platforms to social identity and information exchange platforms, and (3) consequently 
extends our understanding of IP2PLS user behavior.  For future researchers, our work implies 
that a more heterogeneous view of IP2PLS is required, as well as a richer appreciation of the 
interplay between user identity behaviors, community expectations and platform 
functionalities. 
Our work thus also has practical implications for the designers, developers and managers of 
IP2PLS.  First, the heterogeneous nature of IP2PLS communities revealed by the comparison 
of our work to other IP2PLS studies suggests that there is not a one-size-fits-all ideal design 
for IP2PLS. Rather IP2PLS design and functionality must be driven by user information 
requirements and user information sharing expectations (that factors that are significant in 
one IP2PLS may not be significant in another (or indeed, may have an inverse relationship, 
where data are standard in one domain, but are unexpected in another). Second, the 
perspective shift from pure financial transaction platform to social identity platform suggests 
that the design of IP2PLS may better serve its users by facilitating more structured and thus 
“normal” presentation of social identity information within the platform. This would allow 
borrower-users to express identity in ways that may allow lender-users to evaluate them in a 
manner that is more reliable and less prone to cognitive bias.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. List of hypotheses predicting how explicitly expected hard data 
may impact investment and repayment 
H#1: A higher Lending Club credit score will have a positive impact on both a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#2: A higher FICO credit score will have a positive impact on both a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#3: A higher number of public records will have a negative impact on both a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#4: A higher number of account delinquencies will have a negative impact on both a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#5: A lower number of months since the last public record will have a negative impact 
on both a borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#6: A lower number of months since the last account delinquency will have a negative 
impact on both a borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#7: A higher monthly income will have a positive impact on both a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#8: Homeownership will have a positive impact on both a borrower’s likelihood of 
investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#9: A higher number of years in employment will have a positive impact on both a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#10: A higher number of total credit lines will have a positive impact on both a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#11: A higher debt-to-income ratio will have a negative impact on both a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#12: A higher number of open credit lines will have a negative impact on both a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#13: A higher number of credit inquiries in the past 6 months will have a negative 
impact on both a borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#14: A higher revolving credit balance will have a negative impact on both a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment. 
H#15: Higher revolving line utilization will have a negative impact on both a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#16: A higher loan amount will have a negative impact on both a borrower’s likelihood 
of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#17: A higher length of loan duration will have a negative impact on both a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#18: A higher interest rate will have a positive impact on a borrower’s likelihood of 
investment but a negative impact on their likelihood of repayment 
H#19: A higher monthly repayment will have a positive impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment but a negative impact on their likelihood of repayment 
 
Appendix 2. List of hypotheses predicting how possible implicitly expected 
soft data may impact investment and repayment 
H#20: Additional information about a loan’s purpose will have a negative impact on a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#21: Justifications for a borrower’s current financial situation will have a negative 
impact on a borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#22: Claims of future financial responsibility will have a negative impact on a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#23: Claims of past financial responsibility will have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#24: Acknowledgement of financial transgressions will have a negative impact on a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#25: Denial of financial transgressions will have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#26: Denial of a borrower’s education will have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#27: Denial of a borrower’s occupation will have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#28: Denial of a borrower’s employment status will have a negative impact on a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#29: Links to other members will have a negative impact on a borrower’s likelihood of 
investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#30: Links to other online presences possessed by the borrower will have a negative 
impact on a borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#31: Links to photographs will have a negative impact on a borrower’s likelihood of 
investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#32: Details of the borrower’s age will have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#33: Details of the borrower’s gender will have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#34: Details of the borrower’s ethnicity will have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#35: Details of the borrower’s marriage status will have a negative impact on a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#36: Details of the borrower’s children and dependents will have a negative impact on 
a borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#37: Details of the borrower’s hobbies will have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#38: Details of the borrower’s health or obesity will have a negative impact on a 
borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#39: Details of the borrower’s religious or political views will have a negative impact 
on a borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#40: Claims of borrower kindness associated with the loan will have a negative impact 
on a borrower’s likelihood of investment and likelihood of repayment 
H#41: Expressions of gratitude will have a negative impact on a borrower’s likelihood of 
investment and likelihood of repayment 
 
 
FIGURE AND TABLE LEGENDS 
(FIGURES AND TABLES WERE EMBEDDED IN DOCUMENT  
ABOVE FOR EASE OF REFERENCE DURING REVIEW PROCESS) 
Figure Legends  
Figure 1. SIT and Information Sharing Expectations 
Figure 2. Information Sharing Expectations within and between Systems 
Figure 3. Preliminary Model of Relationship between Information Sharing and User Behavior 
Figure 4. The value of loans issued on the Prosper and Lending Club platforms 
Figure 5. Breakdown of binary variables in terms of proportion of funding received 
Figure 6. Revised model of realtionship between information sharing and user behavior 
Table Legends 
Table 1. List of hypotheses predicting how explicitly expected hard data may impact 
investment and repayment 
Table 2. List of hypotheses predicting how possible implicitly expected soft data may impact 
investment and repayment 
Table 3. The online platforms used for data gathering by existing research that investigates 
the likelihood of lender investment and/or borrower repayment 
Table 4. Regression Output for Hard Data 
Table 5. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting The 
Proportion of a Loan Request Received 
Table 6. Summary of Hierarchical Logistic Regression for Variables Predicting The 
Likelihood of a Loan Being Charged Off 
Table 7. Frequencies of codes in 1000 sample records 
Table 8. Regression Output for Soft Data 
Table 9. Contingency table of borrowers’ statement of gratitude and loan default 
  
APPENDIX A. MANUAL CODING EXAMPLES 
Code Category 
 
No New 
Information 
Some New 
Information 
Substantial New 
Information 
Nothing, or 
simply 
repeats 
structured 
data found 
elsewhere in 
request. 
Terse or 
vague 
information 
not found 
elsewhere in 
request. 
Longer or more 
specific 
information not 
found elsewhere 
in request. 
Additional loan purpose 
information 
No mention or 
restates loan 
category. 
 
"Funds to be 
used for 
Development 
and Pre-
Production costs 
on a feature 
film" 
 
 
"Seeking a 
consolidation loan 
for 3 debts totalling 
$1141.83 and 
current monthly 
minimum payments 
of $564.85" 
 
Justification of financial 
situation 
No mention or 
restates loan 
category. 
 
“Just finished 
year one of 
my career 
and it 
involved a lot 
of moving 
and 
relocating 
and large 
miscellaneous 
purchases” 
“I have been 
helping my oldest 
daughter pay 
down her student 
loan from 
college- she 
works full time, 
but low-paying 
job.  My son 
(graduating 
college this May) 
also works, but 
getting fewer and 
fewer hours, so 
my mom and I 
share helping him 
with his living 
expenses.  He 
was able to get 
scholarships and 
grants for the 
first 3 years of 
college, but I am 
paying the loan 
on his senior year 
and 1/2 his 
rent/room/board.  
My middle 
daughter has also 
been relying on 
my help.  Her 
husband has 
abandoned her 
and their 3-year 
old daughter.  
She is working 
full time, but 
cannot afford her 
apartment but 
also was not 
allowed out of 
her lease” 
Claims of future financial 
responsibility 
No mention. 
 
"This (loan) will 
enable me to 
spread the 
repayment of 
these loans over 
a longer period 
so that I can 
free up cash" 
"I make $2350 every 
2 weeks and only 
have car and rent 
payment” 
Claims of past financial 
responsibility 
No mention or 
restates credit 
rating. 
 
"All of the 
cards...have 
never missed a 
payment or 
been late" 
 
"I have knocked 
down $15,000 in 
debt in less than 4 
years" 
 
Acknowledgement/Denial 
of financial transgressions 
No Mention "Large part of 
the debt has 
come from poor 
decisions 
regarding a 
house we 
purchased in 
2005" 
"The loan terms 
were not favorable 
looking out a few 
years, but I 
expected to be able 
to refinance my 
way out before it 
got bad. I was 
working as an IT 
manager and my 
credit record was 
steadily improving. 
Unfortunately, my 
company's parent 
company sold us, 
and I was laid off 
in the process. I 
took a chance and 
tried to go into 
private consulting 
with a partner. 
Without going into 
detail, the 
partnership didn't 
work - we hardly 
made money. We 
broke up, and I 
was left with his 
share of six 
months' expenses, 
which I had 
covered.  I also had 
to deal with the 
eviction of a bad 
tenant and the 
associated 
financial 
pain.  Meanwhile, 
my $300k 1st 
mortgage rate 
climbed to 8%, 
nearly as high as 
my equity loan 
($33k at 9%).  I 
focused on keeping 
the mortgage 
payments current, 
which meant I 
made some hard 
(bad?) decisions to 
get by, including 
running up credit 
card debt, delaying 
payments, and 
becoming late on 
my property taxes 
(which were not 
escrowed.)" 
 
Education details No Mention "I hold a finance 
degree" 
"I recently received 
my CPC and 
graduated class 
valedictorian... In 
the professional 
school I had 
attended" 
Employment status No Mention "have been 
steadily 
employed for 
the past 8 
years" 
"Employed as a 
Director at 
COMPANY X for six 
years" 
 Occupation No Mention "I am in the 
medical field 
and have my 
own practice" 
 
“I am a GS-11 Step 
5 Information 
Technology 
specialist” 
Code Category 
 
Not Present Present 
Links to other members Absent Listed account names, real names, 
URLs. 
Links to other online 
presences 
Absent Listed account names and URLs 
Links to photographs Absent Not found in sample 
Age Absent Explicitly Stated Age 
Gender Absent Explicitly Stated Gender 
Ethnicity Absent Not found in sample 
Marriage details Absent Explicitly stated or implied, e.g. "My 
wife and I keep seperate accounts…" 
 
Children and dependents Absent Explicitly stated or implied, e.g. 
"Ever since she had our first child..." 
Hobbies Absent  Explicitly stated or implied, e.g. "I 
am a huge Suze Orman fan" 
Health and obesity Absent Explicitly stated or implied, e.g. 
"Over 12 years, I have averaged taking 
less than 2 sick days per year" 
Religious or political 
views 
Absent Explicitly stated or implied, e.g. "We 
are old school Americans who believe in 
paying off their debt vs. bankruptcy" 
Claims of kindness Absent Explicitly stated or implied, e.g. 
"One of the reasons I am moving is so I 
can...start helping the poor in my 
community" 
Please or thanks Absent Explicitly stated, e.g. "Please assist 
me" 
Existence of follow-up 
comments 
Absent Follow up comments existed 
 
